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Abstract
This paper discusses Simone de Beauvoir’s views on the meaning of life as presented in The Ethics
of Ambiguity. I argue that Beauvoir’s view matches contemporary hybrid views on the meaning of
life, incorporating both subjective and objective elements, while connecting them in a distinct way -
through the tension between self and other. I then analyze the meaning of excessively competitive
projects through Beauvoir’s ethics and conclude that success that amounts to denying other people’s
access to the things one values is absurd. I use the case of contemporary academia as an illustration
of extreme competition, then employ Beauvoir’s views to suggest a shift towards more meaningful
practices.
1. Introduction
The problem of the meaning of life plays a central  role  in  Simone de Beauvoir’s  existentialist
thought.  This  paper  analyzes  Beauvoir’s  Ethics  of  Ambiguity from  the  perspective  of  current
investigations on the meaning of life, particularly hybrid accounts, then employs Beauvoir’s view as
a framework for discussing ethical issues regarding competition. Beauvoir’s  requirement that in
recognizing  one’s  freedom  one  should  respect  others’  agency  is  at  odds  with  excessively
competitive settings where success amounts to denying other people’s agency and viewing them as
objects.  I  argue  that  in  the  light  of  Beauvoir’s  considerations  success  in  such  circumstances
becomes meaningless. I employ the example of present day academia to highlight when the search
for  knowledge  can  be  seen  as  a  meaningful  project  and  when  it  is  rendered  meaningless  in
accordance with Beauvoir’s ethics.
This investigation contributes to Beauvoir scholarship by situating Beauvoir’s work among
contemporary  research  on  the  meaning  of  life,  and  by  opening  further  connections  to  social
philosophy. For current analytic inquiries into the meaning of life, the present paper builds further
connections  to  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  highlights  an  objective  side  to  existentialist
perspectives on life’s meaning.
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2. The meaning of life in The Ethics of Ambiguity
While my argument is mainly based on The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir’s earlier considerations
on the importance other’s people’s projects and the critique of tyranny from Pyrrhus and Cineas
provide a preliminary version of the argument. Upon questioning the worth of any project given its
finitude, Beauvoir emphasizes the relation to other people as a way of confronting the absurd: ‘so
here is  my situation facing others:  men are free,  and I  am thrown into the world among these
foreign freedoms. I need them because once I have surpassed my own goals, my actions will fall
back upon themselves, inert and useless, if they have not been carried off toward a new future by
new projects’ (Beauvoir, 1944/2004, p. 135). According to Webber’s (2018) analysis of the meaning
of life  in Pyrrhus and Cineas, Beauvoir early ethical  project can be read in Kantian key, as a
categorical imperative to respect others’ agency: ‘Beauvoir’s argument does conclude (...) that we
must treat human agency as objectively valuable. This is not undermined by the fact that it will
sometimes generate genuine dilemmas. Her argument also implies the further claim that we must
consider this structure of human agency to be the foundation of all other values’ (Webber, 2018, p.
229).  On  this  interpretation,  choices  that  diminish  others’ agency  lead  to  absurdity,  even  in
situations where they may be inevitable.
The relation between self and other is explored in relation to the human condition in  The
Ethics of Ambiguity,  where Beauvoir emphasizes  the tension between the freedom to determine
one’s nature, while simultaneously being constrained by living among other human beings: ‘He
asserts himself as a pure internality against which no external power can take hold, and he also
experiences himself as a thing crushed by the dark weight of other things (…) This privilege, which
he alone possesses, of being a sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects, is what he
shares with all his fellow-men. In turn an object for others, he is nothing more than an individual in
the collectivity on which he depends’ (Beauvoir, 1947/1976, p. 7). Departing from philosophical
approaches that exclusively focus on one of these aspects while neglecting the other,  Beauvoir
suggests that meaning must be searched in connection to ambiguity: ‘Let us try to assume our
fundamental ambiguity. It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must
draw our strength to live and our reason for acting’ (Beauvoir, 1947/1976, p. 9). Life’s meaning,
discussed  in  terms  of  significance,  value,  or  transcendence,  is  closely  connected  to  Beauvoir’s
treatment of freedom and pursuing projects: ‘Freedom is the source from which all significations
and all values spring’ (Beauvoir, 1947/1976, p. 24).
In discussing the possibility of genuine freedom, Beauvoir relies on Sartre’s claim that ‘this
being is the foundation of itself as a lack of being; that is, that it determines its being by means of a
being which it is not’ (Sartre, 1943, p. 86). Exploring how human beings succeed or fail to reach
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genuine  freedom and  acknowledge  the  ambiguity  of  the  human  condition,  Beauvoir  discusses
several human types (and possibly historical figures). For instance, the figure of the subman reveals
someone  who  does  not  acknowledge  the  lack  of  being,  and,  subsequently,  cannot  determine
meaning for himself. The subman can easily succumb to tyrannical projects by the figure of the
serious man. Beauvoir describes the serious man as someone who acknowledges the lack of being,
but upon setting goals he takes them as absolutes, thus negating both his freedom as well as that of
other  people.  The  serious  man  can  pursue  military,  economic,  or  political  goals  without  ever
bringing their worth into question. This way, Beauvoir holds, ‘it is natural that he makes himself a
tyrant. Dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his choice, he pretends that the unconditioned value
of the object is being asserted through him; and by the same token he also ignores the value of the
subjectivity and the freedom of others,  to such an extent that,  sacrificing them to the thing, he
persuades himself that what he sacrifices is nothing’ (Beauvoir, 1947/1976, p. 49). This continues
Beauvoir’s reflections from Pyrrhus and Cineas: a tyrant’s project is bound to absurdity because it
disregards the agency of the people dominated while increasing the tyrant’s power. 
In the  Ethics of Ambiguity, tyranny is not confined to the serious man. Beauvoir explores
how the adventurer (or more generally, someone pursuing one’s passion) can become a tyrant, by
treating other people as objects. In the same context, however, the possibility of genuine freedom is
highlighted: 
Passion  is  converted  to  genuine  freedom only  if  one  destines  his
existence to other existences through the being - whether thing or man
– at which he aims, without hoping to entrap it in the destiny of the
in-itself.
Thus, we see that no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited
to  itself.  It  appeals  to  the  existence  of  others.  The idea  of  such a
dependence  is  frightening,  and  the  separation  and  multiplicity  of
existants raises highly disturbing problems (Beauvoir, 1947/1976, p.
67).
Thus, one of the key differences between genuine and non-genuine approaches to freedom consists
in one’s relation to others. More closely connected to the question of what meaningful projects
amount to, Beauvoir holds that ‘no project can be defined except by its interference with other
projects.  To  make  being  “be”  is  to  communicate  with  others  by  means  of  being’ (Beauvoir,
1947/1976, p. 71). This aspect is emphasized by Arp’s analysis of Beauvoir’s concept of moral
freedom as ‘a projection of meaning into the future by a group of intertwined freedoms’ (2001, p.
72).
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Having  spelled  out  Beauvoir’s  view  on  genuine  freedom and  meaningful  projects,  one
remaining aspect relevant to the current paper is the figure of the critic. According to Beauvoir,
critical thought attacks the ‘serious world’ while at the same time not falling into pure negation the
way the adventurer or the nihilist would. Nevertheless, the critic’s dedication to independence (or
objective truth) is marked by ambiguity: ‘the independent man is still a man with his particular
situation in the world,  and what  he defines as objective truth is  the object  of his  own choice’
(Beauvoir, 1947/1976, pp. 68-69). A critic who does not recognize this ambiguity falls into the
world of the serious man. As critical thought and dedication to the truth are central to projects
pursuing  knowledge,  the  question  of  how  such  a  project  is  meaningful  requires  facing  the
possibility  of  passing  from ambiguity  to  the  serious  world.  In  what  follows  I  will  focus  on  a
different way in which a critic becomes a serious man: by affirming the value of his own project
through denying meaningful projects to other critics.
3. Meaningful projects and competition
The  discussion  so  far  has  emphasized  Beauvoir’s  view on  meaningful  projects  as  recognizing
ambiguity and particularly the presence of others’ projects as necessary for genuine freedom. In this
section I situate Beauvoir’s view among contemporary analytic classifications of views on meaning
in life, then explore its implications for ethical problems raised by extreme competition.
I  employ  Metz’s  (2013a,  2013b)  categorization  of  different  views  on  meaning  in  life,
particularly those falling under naturalism, describing meaning in relation to the physical world
(Metz, 2013b, section 3). The subjectivist and objectivist strands of naturalism are explained by
Metz as follows: subjectivism holds that ‘meaning in life varies from person to person, depending
on each one's variable mental states’ (Metz, 2013b, section 3.1), while according to objectivism:
‘meaning is constituted (at  least  in part)  by something physical independent of the mind about
which we can have correct or incorrect beliefs’ (Metz, 2013b, section 3.2). These two views are not
exclusive, as a meaningful life can be a matter of one’s preferences while also meeting standards
outside one’s own perspective. This view is held, among others, by Susan Wolf: meaning ‘involves
subjective  and  objective  elements,  suitably  and  inextricably  linked’,  or  ‘meaning  arises  when
subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’ (2010, p. 9). I argue that this view also applies
to Beauvoir’s ethics, with significant differences from Wolf’s approach. 
In discussing the clash between the subjective capacity to decide meaning for oneself, and
the constraints stemming from one’s relation to others, Beauvoir is pointing out a tension between
subjective and objective perspectives on meaning in life. Her view on the ambiguity of the human
condition and genuine freedom incorporates both aspects: once one acknowledges one’s freedom,
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one can pursue a project one deems meaningful; nevertheless, in so doing it is necessary to position
one’s projects in relation to others in certain ways. Before contrasting Beauvoir’s view with Wolf’s,
I will address one possible objection regarding whether Beauvoir’s view should be classified as
hybrid  given  Metz’s  (2002;  2013b)  singling  out  existentialism  as  a  paradigmatic  example  of
subjectivism  about  meaning  in  life.  My  analysis  so  far  highlights  a  divergence  between  a
conception of existentialism focusing on radical freedom and responsibility widely attributed to
Sartre, and Beauvoir’s version of existentialism. As pointed out by Simons, the relation between
self  and  other  had  been  a  central  topic  in  Beauvoir’s  work,  that  she  addressed  before  Sartre:
‘Beauvoir was the first one to address herself to the problem of the Other, a concern which later
became so  prominent  in  Sartre’s  work’ (1986,  p.  169).  Thus,  existentialism is  not  confined  to
subjective  views  on  meaning  in  life,  and  can  incorporate  objective  aspects  as  illustrated  in
Beauvoir’s philosophy.
In an  important  sense Beauvoir’s  view fits  the structure proposed by Wolf,  not  only  in
incorporating  subjective  and  objective  components,  but  also  in  capturing  their  interaction.
Nevertheless,  while  Wolf  proposes  a  view that  ‘sees  subjective  and  objective  elements  fitting
together to constitute a coherent feature a life might or might not possess’ (2010, p. 20), Beauvoir
emphasizes how the two are in conflict. In explaining the project of writing a novel, Wolf would
refer to one’s passion for writing, but also to the objective value of literature. Beauvoir’s picture
would add the acknowledgment of ambiguity, recognizing a possible tension between one’s passion
for writing, and the social conditions under which one undertakes this project. For instance, if one’s
living depends on it, should one write on topics one cares about or focus the interests of the public?
Should one write in view of pressing social issues, or pursue a topic out of pure personal interest?
We see  how Beauvoir’s  view fits  the  hybrid  models  in  a  peculiar  way,  by  capturing  possible
tensions  and plausible  dilemmas  when  weighing  one’s  subjective  preferences  against  objective
conditions, among which Beauvoir particularly emphasizes social and historical factors. Beauvoir’s
perspective on objectivity stresses social dimensions, which need not be the case for Wolf. Consider
a  pioneering  scientist  passionate  about  his  research  making  a  discovery  that  the  scientific
community at the time fails to acknowledge. While on Wolf’s view the discovery can be objectively
valuable without social recognition,  Beauvoir’s perspective would identify objective meaning in
how the discovery enables novel lines of research by other scientists, but not necessarily social
approval per se.
The relation between meaning and morality is another point of divergence between Beauvoir
and Wolf. While Wolf argues that meaning is independent from morality, in Beauvoir’s work there
is  an  important  connection  between the  two.  Wolf  emphasizes  how morality  need not  imply  a
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meaningful life, as in cases where one is not interested in the particular moral projects undertaken.
By  contrast,  Beauvoir  emphasizes  the  absurdity  of  immoral  projects,  and  the  subsequent
meaninglessness of an immoral life. The two views are not in conflict insofar as morality does not
completely overlap  with  a  meaningful  life,  but  for  Beauvoir  morality  understood as  respecting
others’ agency is necessary for meaning.1 Thus, while for Wolf morality is neither necessary nor
sufficient for meaning in life, for Beauvoir morality is necessary for a meaningful life. 
Having classified Beauvoir’s view as a hybrid account on meaning in life, I will now use
this  framework to  explore the relation between meaning and competitive projects.  Wolf’s  view
helps understand two aspects of competition: competitive projects have an objective dimension, as
several people are pursuing them, and there are standards for success - say, someone who enjoys
running thinks it is worthwhile to win a marathon. Now from Beauvoir’s perspective, the question
is whether pursuing certain kinds of competitive projects can yield a meaningful life. Competitive
projects clearly evince a conflict between subject and other: in seeking victory, one may grow to
view the other competitors as obstacles, and even rejoice at another competitor’s misfortune if that
increases one’s chances of winning. To provide a satisfactory answer to this question, I will first
explore ethical dimensions of competition.
Competition comes in degrees, and not all competitive settings may undermine the relation
between  self  and  other;  I  focus  on  cases  where  competition  undermines  social  connectedness
instead of affirming it. Hussain’s (2018) study in the context of political philosophy is illustrative of
the type of competition I refer to: ‘a certain degree of competition in social life is clearly acceptable,
but – just as clearly – there are limits: social institutions can be morally defective when they pit
people against each other excessively. (…) Excessively competitive institutions are antisocial and
antithetical  to  certain  forms  of  social  connectedness’ (Hussain,  2018,  pp.  14-15).  Hussain’s
argument  holds  that  social  connectedness  would  have  members  of  a  political  community  be
‘mutually affirming with respect to the projects that constitute the common good’ (p. 13). This type
of political community would break down in cases of life or death competitions such as securing
jobs in the context of a weak public health system; as health is part of the common good, one would
end up undermining as opposed to affirming other people’s benefiting from health services (pp. 13-
14). Thus, I will refer to competition in a qualified sense, incorporating its excessive degree and
applicability to contexts where mutual affirmation is desirable.
Hussain’s argument  shows that  excessive competition is  immoral  because it  undermines
mutual affirmation, which is seen as intrinsically valuable. Mutual affirmation, or an equivalent
1 For support of this interpretation, cf. Webber on king Pyrrhus’s project being ‘absurd because it is immoral’ (2018, 
p. 231).
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concept is also present in Beauvoir’s philosophy. As pointed out by Stone, for Beauvoir ‘freedom is
inherently opened onto other people’ to the effect that ‘having affirmed my native openness toward
others, it would be inconsistent to then wish limits and servitude upon them’ (1987, p. 125). The
same point can be extended to agency and meaning – meaningful projects should not undermine
social connectedness, and ideally enhance it. Insofar as extreme competition leads to denying other
people the things one values, a successful project along these lines would only make sense from the
perspective of the serious man and his tyrannical attitude.  By contrast,  Beauvoir emphasizes in
Pyrrhus  and  Cineas:  ‘If  I  want  to  be  courageous,  skillful,  and  intelligent,  I  cannot  scorn  the
courage, skill, or intelligence in the other’ (Beauvoir, 1944/2004, p. 135). It is this particular attitude
with regard to academic success that I will explore in section 4; I argue that on Beauvoir’s view
knowledge  is  more  akin  to  the  common good as  opposed  to  a  prize  to  be  won  against  other
competitors.
4. Competitive critics or serious men? Meaning in present day academia
Transferring the figure of the critic to present day, one may think of a critic seeking meaning in
researching a scholarly field (say, history or literature), and by bringing forth different approaches
or interpretations to challenge ‘serious’ stories in support of a given social or political setting. If the
critic also aims to engage in teaching, she may challenge the certainties imposed on the students and
encourage them to undertake critical thought on their own. In most current academic environments
this project would amount to engaging in fierce competition with other academics: competing to
secure short- and long-term appointments, grants and funding, publications in prestigious venues.
Success  in  these  endeavors,  and  thus  the  ability  to  keep  on  pursuing  her  intellectual  goals,
inevitably means barring other like-minded individuals from completing their meaningful projects.
Further supposing the critic is successful and secures a position where she can focus on her favorite
research topics, the ‘two-tier’ model of academic labor (see Cardozo 2017; Zheng 2018) would
make this success conditional on other people working in precarious conditions in areas deemed
less valuable, such as teaching, mentoring, or service.. Academic success here means pursuing one’s
goal while diminishing the agency of people with similar goals and values: one can dedicate one’s
time to research because others take over the teaching responsibilities; one can enjoy job security
because other employees are on contingent appointments. Finally, in order to make her work visible
and collaborate on the most successful projects, the critic may choose to primarily engage with
work of academics of comparable status, disregarding people from the lower tier. Is success as
portrayed in this scenario something that the critic would hope for, or has the critic become the
serious man?
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As discussed in section 2, the goals of the critic appear meaningful in Beauvoir’s analysis as
long  as  they  challenge  the  serious  world  and  the  critic  is  aware  of  the  ambiguity  of  human
existence. Once such projects are possible only in a hyper competitive setting, as is the case today,
they are presented as worthy of sacrificing other people’s freedom and agency – by simply securing
the  benefits  of  academia  in  the  first  instance,  but  also  by  keeping  other  people  in  precarious
conditions. This picture of academia looks very similar to the world of the serious man, or the
tyrant.
It  may be objected that  this  need not  always be the case about  academia,  since not  all
successful academics look down upon less acclaimed peers. Even so, kindness to fellow academics
does not rule out the allegiance to the ‘serious world’ and absolute goals.  To fulfill  Beauvoir’s
conditions for meaning, one would need to act to render co-existing projects possible. 
Another objection would point to the benefits of competition: many academics find debates
stimulating.  This  objection,  however,  relies  on  a  sense  of  competition  different  from  the  one
discussed above: academics who end up improving their  work as a result  of fierce debates are
arguably affirming one another’s passion for the subject. If anything, the winner would lose from
having a rival driven out of the profession, which further emphasizes the absurdity of victory in
competitions where one either wins or perishes. 
Yet another objection would hold that Beauvoir’s considerations might as well apply to all
competition, as examples such as professional sport show. Without analyzing competition in sport,
in response I distinguish success from agency. Winning a contest means everyone else loses, but
that does not necessarily rule out acknowledging the top performers, or diminish their capacity to
compete again. In fact, the existence of the practice is conditional on the availability of competitors.
By contrast, success at securing a ‘first tier’ academic position renders other academics less capable
of pursuing their projects as they would do so with diminished access to time for research or other
resources. Also, it is difficult to see how the existence of academic work would depend on this
particular structure. The former illustrates success at the expense of others’ success characteristic of
all competitive projects, but it is the latter - success at the expense of others’ agency - that counts as
absurd on Beauvoir’s account.
Success  according  to  current  academic  measurements  appears,  thus,  absurd  because  it
undermines  others’  agency.  This  also  transpires  from  sociological  analyses  of  academic
competition, as Carson et al. note: ‘What prevents us from opening our eyes to the absurdity of the
academic situation? (...) Coming back to Alice’s question ‘‘Who won the race?’’ we conclude that
currently we are all losing’ (2013, p. 189). While Beauvoir’s view helps explain why this way of
pursuing knowledge is unethical and therefore meaningless, it can also point possible shifts in focus
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to render it meaningful. One possibility would be to emphasize the inherent value of knowledge as
opposed to the benefits of an academic position. However, Beauvoir would classify this attitude as
inauthentic because it lacks a direct connection to agency (Shabot 2016).2 Since agency is central to
realizing one’s freedom according to Beauvoir, a purely contemplative stance (say, intellectual or
aesthetic) takes the world for granted and denies one’s agency (Beauvoir 1947/1976, pp. 35-37).
Furthermore, and more closely related to the purposes here, pursuing a project for its own sake does
not necessarily involve social connectedness, as it  can be done in isolation from other people’s
projects. 
Another  way  to  go,  that,  I  argue,  can  be  derived  from  Beauvoir’s  view,  investigates
knowledge through the perspective of the relation between self and other. Relevant questions arising
here would concern how one can use knowledge to increase others’ agency and possibilities of
pursuing  meaningful  projects.  Another  look  at  academia  shows  that  teaching,  mentoring,  or
collaborative endeavors are ways of valuing other people’s projects and increasing their agency. An
academic  introducing  students  to  a  research  topic  enables  them to  pursue  epistemic  goals  and
possibly affirm freedom against the serious world. As Bergoffen describes Beauvoir’s views, ‘the
success of our projects depends on the extent to which they are adopted by others’ (2018, section 2).
Under  this  standard,  it  is  unclear  how academic  projects  can  be meaningfully  continued when
academics compete to secure resources in an environment where secure positions are disappearing.
By contrast, introducing others to the topic one deems valuable emphasizes its worth and enables its
continuation in one form or another. 
To conclude, analyzing academic projects through Beauvoir’s considerations on meaning in
life shows why practices that disregard other people are ultimately meaningless, while increasingly
neglected  parts  of  the  academic  life,  such as  teaching,  justify  the  meaning of  one’s  pursuit  of
knowledge.
5. Conclusions
This  paper  has  explored  how Beauvoir’s  existentialist  ethics contributes  to  current  debates  on
meaning  in  life.  Notably,  Beauvoir’s  account  of  the  relation  between  self  and  other  and  the
ambiguity of human existence raises important questions regarding the meaning of competitive
projects.  I  have  shown  how  Beauvoir’s  approach  can  be  employed  to  understand  meaning  in
relation  to  other  people,  and  to  criticize  antisocial  pursuits  or  institutions  in  view  of  their
meaninglessness. More broadly, the present investigation shows how philosophical research on the
meaning  of  life,  and  Beauvoir’s  view  in  particular,  can  provide  leads  to  understanding  the
2 Also see Shabot (2016) for a critique of this view.
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importance  of  social  connectedness  in  seeking  meaning.  The  analysis  of  academia  from  an
existentialist perspective explains its absurd aspects while also showing the need for a shift in focus,
towards more mutually affirming practices. Thus, the importance of Beauvoir’s philosophy with
respect to meaning in life goes beyond understanding concepts, assisting in making sense of broader
social situations.
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